Across three studies, we examined the role of self-evaluation in predicting conspiracy beliefs. Previous research linked the endorsement of conspiracy theories to low self-esteem.
Does self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs?

Narcissism, self-esteem and the endorsement of conspiracy theories
Although conspiracy theories are often treated as harmless entertainment, they can have serious societal consequences (Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2015) . For example, exposure to conspiracy theories can decrease political engagement or pro-environmental behavior (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; 2014b) . If widespread conspiracy theories affect the society, then it seems important to understand psychological factors underlying conspiracy beliefs. One prevalent hypothesis in this line of inquiry has been that conspiracy theories are usually endorsed by individuals who show poor psychological adjustment or are in some way socially disadvantaged. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to powerlessness (AbalakinaPaap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999) , feelings of relative deprivation (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013) , anomie (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) , lack of personal control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; cf. Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013) , uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2012; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015) , and being a member of a disadvantaged group (Abalkina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Goertzel, 1994) . It has been theorized that belief in others´ conspiratorial actions that unfairly undermine one's own efforts, can serve to protect feelings of self-worth (Robins & Post, 1997) .
In line with this reasoning, Abalkina-Paap and colleagues (1999) proposed that conspiracy beliefs should be endorsed by people with low self-esteem "because this permits them to blame others for their problems" (p. 644). So far, however, evidence linking conspiracy beliefs to low self-esteem remains inconsistent. Low self-esteem was only a marginally significant predictor of various conspiracy beliefs in the study by Abalkina-Paap and colleagues (1999) . In other studies, low self-esteem significantly predicted endorsement of some conspiracy theories (e.g., concerning the London bombings of July 7, 2005 , Swami et al., 2011 ; see also Swami & Furnham, 2012) but not others (e.g., concerning conspiratorial actions of Jews, Swami, 2012 ; see also Crocker et al., 1999; Stieger, Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek, & Swami, 2013) . Similarly, general conspiracist ideation was negatively correlated with self-esteem in a study by Stieger and colleagues (2013;  although the correlation was significant only in the first wave of measurement) but this relationship was weaker and nonsignificant in a study by Swami (2012) .
We suggest that linking conspiracy beliefs to low self-esteem could have been premature. There are in fact reasons to believe that the endorsement of conspiracy theories might be more strongly associated with excessively positive view of the self. Convictions about others' malevolent intentions have been linked to individual narcissism, which is characterised by a pattern of grandiosity accompanied by the need for external validation (Freud, 1914 (Freud, /2012 Fromm, 1964 Fromm, /2010 Raskin & Terry, 1988; Robins & Post, 1997; Wulff, 1987) . Narcissists tend to believe they are unique and special compared to other people (Reynolds & Lejuez, 2011) but, at the same time, they are excessively preoccupied with how others see them (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Horvath & Morf, 2009) . Research shows that such heightened self-reference and awareness of others' perceptions can foster paranoia-a tendency to perceive others' actions as intentionally malicious (Feningsten & Vanable, 1992;  see Cameron, 1959; Cicero & Kerns, 2011; Raskin & Terry, 1988) . Paranoia has been identified as a robust predictor of conspiracy beliefs, which correspond to a more specific conviction that a major political or social event is intentionally caused by "a secret plot by a covert alliance of powerful individuals or organizations" (Douglas & Suttton, 2011, p. 3; e.g., Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin, Neale, & Holmes, 2011; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Kramer & Schaffer, 2014; Wilson & Rose, 2014) . Melley (2002) suggested that it is the intentionality bias that makes the paranoid prone to perceive significant events as being caused by conspiracies. By integrating these perspectives, we predict that narcissists should be especially likely to endorse conspiracy theories, as due to their sensitivity to others' perceptions they show paranoid tendencies.
Importantly, the propositions that conspiracy beliefs are related to low self-esteem and to high individual narcissism are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, one reason for the inconsistent link between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs, revealed by previous studies, could be that typical measures of self-esteem do not distinguish between self-evaluation that is narcissistic versus secure (i.e., without the defensive component captured by narcissism; Horney, 1939; Kernis, 2003; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004) . Narcissistic and secure self-esteem overlap in favourable self-evaluation but when they are considered in the same regression analysis, we can observe their unique effects (Paulhus et al., 2004) . For example, previous research demonstrated that low self-esteem becomes a predictor of antisocial behaviour only when the variance it shares with individual narcissism is accounted for. Moreover, when both variables are considered, the effects of narcissism on antisocial behaviour tend to significantly strengthen (Locke, 2009; Paulhus et al., 2004) . Such a pattern of results indicates a suppression effect, in which inclusion of a suppressor variable in the analyses "increases the predictive validity of another variable" (Conger, 1974, pp. 36-37; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000) . Therefore, to fully examine the link between conspiracy beliefs and self-evaluation, both narcissism and self-esteem should be considered.
Overview
The aim of the current research is to shed light on the role of individual narcissism and self-esteem in predicting conspiracy beliefs. In three studies we test the hypothesis that when the overlap between self-esteem and individual narcissism is controlled for, conspiracy beliefs will be predicted by high individual narcissism and low self-esteem. We also examine whether the effects of individual narcissism versus self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs are mediated by paranoid ideation (Study 2) or whether they can be accounted for by a general negativity towards humans (Study 3). In addition, given that conspiracy theories often presume an intergroup dimension (Kofta & Sędek, 2005; van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014) , in Study 2 we examine whether the effects differ depending on the conspiracy theories involving in-group or out-group members. In all studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures.
Study 1
In Study 1 we tested the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs would be predicted by high individual narcissism but low self-esteem. We expected self-esteem and individual narcissism to work as mutual suppressors in predicting conspiracy beliefs-considering both aspects of self-evaluation together should strengthen their initial relationships with conspiracy beliefs.
Method
Participants and procedure. We aimed to collect data from at least 200 Mturk workers. For consistency, we asked only for workers located in the US. 
Measures.
1 In all studies, only completed surveys were analyzed. Study 1 included an attention check. Excluding data from 13 participants who failed it did not affect the results. 2 None of the demographic variables was associated with conspiracy beliefs in Study 1. In Studies 2 and 3 ethnic minorities endorsed conspiracy theories more strongly than Whites. Unless stated otherwise, the pattern of results remained similar when we adjusted for demographics (age, gender, ethnicity, education in Studies 1 and 2; age, gender, ethnicity in Study 3) in the regression analyses.
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with the 15 item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs
Scale (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013 Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale. Participants responded to 10 items on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, α=.93,
M=3.82, SD=0.89.
Individual narcissism was measured with a simplified version (Ang & Yusof, 2006) of the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Hall, 1979) .
Participants rated to what extent statements representing narcissistic traits described them on a scale from 1=not at all like me to 5=very much like me, α=.96, M=2.79, SD=0.70. We then tested whether the inclusion of narcissism in the regression model increased the predictive validity of self-esteem resulting in a suppression effect. We used Mplus7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 -2012 . Program defaults were used for the estimator and treatment of missing data (the same settings were used for all path analyses). Bootstrapping analysis 
Results
Zero
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide initial support for our hypothesis that adjusting for the overlap between self-esteem and individual narcissism reveals the opposite relationships these variables have with belief in conspiracy theories. When the variance shared between these variables was accounted for, the negative relationship between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs became significant, while the positive relationship between individual narcissism and conspiracy beliefs strengthened. Thus, only with individual narcissism partialled out did low self-esteem predict conspiracy beliefs.
Study 2
In Study 2 we examined whether the effects of high individual narcissism and low self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs are mediated by paranoid thought. We expected high individual narcissism and low self-esteem to be associated with paranoia which should further foster conspiracist ideation. Moreover, because conspiracy theories often refer to malevolent actions of groups (e.g., Kofta & Sędek, 2005) , we wanted to distinguish whether it is a narcissistic image of the self or the group that predicts the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Previous research has linked conspiracy beliefs to collective narcissism-belief ingroup's greatness associated with a conviction that others do not appreciate the in-group enough (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009 First, participants completed measures of individual and collective narcissism and self-esteem (counterbalanced) 4 . Afterwards, they completed a paranoid thought scale. Finally, they were randomly assigned to complete one of two versions of the conspiracy beliefs scale.
In the in-group version (n=140) they were asked to think about the American government and answer questions about belief in the government's conspiratorial actions. In the out-group version (n=129) they were asked to think about foreign governments and answer a similar set of questions but in relation to conspiratorial actions of foreign governments (see Supplement).
Measures.
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with 11 items based on the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013) Collective narcissism was measured with the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) . Participants responded to items measuring their sentiments towards their national group (e.g., "Americans deserve special treatment") on a scale from 1=definitely disagree to 6=definitely agree, α=.88, M=2.58, SD=1.17.
Paranoid thought was measured with the 20-item Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) . Participants were asked to respond to each item (e.g., "Someone has it in for me") on a scale from 1=not at all applicable to me to 5=extremely applicable to me, α=.92,
M=2.35, SD=0.76.
Results
Zero-order correlations. Self-esteem and the two forms of narcissism were all significantly positively correlated (Table 1) We then examined whether these opposing relationships would be differentially mediated via paranoid thought. In MPlus7 we tested a path model with self-esteem and individual narcissism as predictors (both included in the model command), conspiracy beliefs as the outcome, paranoid thought as a mediator, and condition as a covariate (Figure 2 ). paranoid thought, the pattern of results remained the same. We also tested whether the effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs was mediated by paranoid thought but this effect was non-significant and was not conditional on the content of conspiracies.
Discussion
Study 2 corroborated the results of Study 1 by demonstrating that individual narcissism suppresses the link between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs. Self-esteem alone was not significantly correlated with conspiracy beliefs, but it became a marginally significant negative predictor of conspiracy beliefs when its overlap with individual narcissism was adjusted for. Individual narcissism was significantly positively correlated with conspiracy beliefs and this effect remained significant when we adjusted for self-esteem.
Study 2 also demonstrated that paranoid thought was associated with high individual narcissism but low self-esteem. Moreover, paranoid thought differentially mediated the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and these two types of self-evaluation and these effects were larger than those of competing indirect effects models.
Finally, Study 2 revealed that individual narcissism predicted conspiracy beliefs even when adjusting for its overlap with collective narcissism. The effect of individual narcissism on the endorsement of conspiracy theories was not moderated by whether these theories involved own versus foreign governments, while collective narcissism significantly predicted only the endorsement of conspiracy theories about foreign governments (replicating previous research; Cichocka et al., 2015) .
Study 3
As in Study 1, in Study 2 individual narcissism was a significant predictor of conspiracy belief. However, in Study 2 the negative effect of self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs was weaker than in Study 1 and only marginally significant. We therefore sought to replicate the suppression effect with the use of a larger sample of at least 500 participants, which should allow for detecting even small indirect effects with the use of bias-corrected bootstrapping (assuming power of .80; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007 ). Moreover, we tested the robustness of our findings by implementing a different measure of conspiracy beliefs. While in Studies 1 and 2 we measured generic conspiracist ideation (Brotherton et al., 2013) 
Measures.
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with a 7-item Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Douglas et al., in press ). Participants were asked to what extent they agree with a series of statements about well-known conspiracy theories, e.g., "The American moon landings were faked." on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree, α=. 82, M=2.47, SD=1.20. 7 We are grateful to an anonymous Reviewer for this suggestion. 8 Study 3 also included measures of ideology and prejudice for purposes of a different project.
Self-esteem was measured as in Study 1, α=.93, M=3.79, SD=0.92 .
Individual narcissism was measured with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979 
Results
Zero-order correlations. Self-esteem was significantly positively correlated with individual narcissism and humanity esteem. Humanity esteem was unrelated to narcissism, p=.68. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively correlated with individual narcissism and not significantly with self-esteem, p=.78. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly negatively correlated with humanity esteem (Table 2) . 
Discussion
In Study 3 self-esteem and individual narcissism acted as mutual suppressors in predicting conspiracy beliefs. When we adjusted for their overlap, the positive effect of narcissism strengthened, and the non-significant effect of self-esteem became significantly negative. Moreover, when we accounted for the effects of humanity esteem, the effect of narcissism on conspiracy decreased slightly but remained significant, while the effect of selfesteem became non-significant and close to zero. This suggests that the effect of low selfesteem on conspiracy beliefs can be largely attributed to the fact that low self-esteem predicts negative perceptions of humanity more broadly.
General Discussion
Results of three studies demonstrated that the endorsement of conspiracy theories is positively associated with individual narcissism. Individual narcissism was a robust predictor of general conspiracy ideation (Studies 1 and 2) as well as of beliefs in several specific conspiracy theories (Study 3). In Study 2 individual narcissism predicted the endorsement of conspiracy theories regardless of these theories implicating in-group or out-group members.
This effect remained significant even when we accounted for collective narcissism-another variable frequently linked to the endorsement of conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al., 2015) .
Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that individual narcissism remained a significant predictor of conspiracy beliefs when we accounted for general negativity towards humanity. We suggest that individual narcissists might be especially prone to believe in conspiracy theories due to their elevated self-consciousness connected with exaggerated feelings of being in the centre of others' attention (Emmons, 1987; and perceiving others' behaviour as intentionally targeted against them (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) . Such perceptions are linked to higher degrees of paranoid thoughts which, in turn, foster proneness for conspiracy beliefs (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Kramer, 1998) . Indeed, Study 2 demonstrated that the effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs was driven by paranoid thought.
In all studies self-esteem alone was not significantly correlated with belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, when the overlap between individual narcissism and selfesteem was accounted for, self-esteem became a significant or marginally significant negative predictor of conspiracy beliefs. This suggests that conspiracy beliefs are negatively associated with secure self-esteem (i.e., self-evaluation without the narcissistic component; Paulhus et al., 2004) . However, across all studies this effect was weaker than that of narcissism and became close to zero once we accounted for the relationship between low self-esteem and negativity towards humanity (Study 3). Overall, these results shed light on why previous research might have yielded inconsistent results pertaining to the link between self-evaluation and conspiracy beliefs (Abalkina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami, 2012) . The current findings challenge the assumption that conspiracy theories are endorsed only by those who lack confidence (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994) .
Rather, our results suggest that conspiracy beliefs might be associated with self-promotional personality characteristics, such as individual narcissism.
Of course, as our studies were correlational, they do not allow us to establish causal relationships between the variables. There are reasons to believe that narcissism and selfesteem are basic personality predispositions predicting the more malleable conspiracy beliefs and we hope that the current research offers at least preliminary indication of the psychological mechanism that drives these connections. Nevertheless, it is also possible that these predispositions affect each other in a dynamic system (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004) . Further research would do well to examine the causal pathways of the proposed mediation model as well as to investigate the consequences exposure to conspiracy theories might have for the individual self-concept.
